LOCKHEED-MARTIN SKUNK WORKS ADP SR-71 SPY PLANE BLACKBIRD BLUE #3 velkrö PATCH

Description: LOCKHEED-MARTIN SKUNK WORKS ADP SR-71 SPY PLANE BLACKBIRD BLUE #3 velkrö PATCHThis is an (not cheap import copy) USAF LOCKHEED-MARTIN SKUNK WORKS MACH 3+ SR-71 SPY PLANE BLACKBIRD BLUE #3 velkrö (burdock-velkrö) PATCH. You will receive the item as shown in the first photo. Please note that there are color variations due to settings on different PCs/Monitors. The color shown on your screen may not be the true color. Personal check payment is welcomed. Skunk Works is an official alias for Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Programs (ADP), formerly called Lockheed Advanced Development Projects. Skunk Works is responsible for a number of famous aircraft designs, including theU-2, the SR-71 Blackbird, the F-117 Nighthawk, and the F-22 Raptor. Currently its largest officially known project is the F-35 Lightning II, which will be used in the air forces of several countries. Production is expected to last for up to four decades. The designation "skunk works", or "skunkworks", is widely used in business, engineering, and technical fields to describe a group within an organization given a high degree of autonomy and unhampered by bureaucracy, tasked with working on advanced or secret projects. The Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird" is a long-range, high-altitude, Mach 3+ strategic reconnaissance aircraft developed and manufactured by the American aerospace company Lockheed Corporation. It was operated by both the United States Air Force (USAF) and NASA.[1] The SR-71 was developed as a black project from the Lockheed A-12 reconnaissance aircraft during the 1960s by Lockheed's Skunk Works division. American aerospace engineer Clarence "Kelly" Johnson was responsible for many of the aircraft's innovative concepts. The shape of the SR-71 was based on that of the A-12, which was one of the first aircraft to be designed with a reduced radar cross-section. At one point, a bomber variant of the aircraft was under consideration, before the program was focused solely on reconnaissance. Mission equipment for the reconnaissance role included signals intelligence sensors, side-looking airborne radar, and a camera; the SR-71 was both longer and heavier than the A-12, allowing it to hold more fuel as well as a two-seat cockpit. The SR-71 designation has been attributed to lobbying efforts by USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, who preferred the SR (Strategic Reconnaissance) designation over simply RS (Reconnaissance, Strategic). The aircraft entered service in January 1966. During aerial reconnaissance missions, the SR-71 operated at high speeds and altitudes (Mach 3.2 and 85,000 feet, 25,900 meters), allowing it to outrace or entirely avoid threats. If a surface-to-air missile launch was detected, the standard evasive action was simply to accelerate and outpace the missile. On average, each SR-71 could fly once per week due to the extended turnaround required after mission recovery. A total of 32 aircraft were built; 12 were lost in accidents with none lost to enemy action. During 1988, the USAF retired the SR-71 largely for political reasons; several were briefly reactivated during the 1990s before their second retirement in 1998. NASA was the final operator of the Blackbird, retiring their aircraft in 1999. Since its retirement, the SR-71's role has been taken up by a combination of reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); a proposed UAV successor, the SR-72, is under development by Lockheed Martin, and scheduled to fly in 2025. The SR-71 has several nicknames, including "Blackbird" and "Habu". As of 2022 the SR-71 still holds the world record it set in 1976 as the fastest air-breathing manned aircraft, previously held by the related Lockheed YF-12. The SR-71 designation is a continuation of the pre-1962 bomber series; the last aircraft built using the series was the XB-70 Valkyrie. However, a bomber variant of the Blackbird was briefly given the B-71 designator, which was retained when the type was changed to SR-71. During the later stages of its testing, the B-70 was proposed for a reconnaissance/strike role, with an "RS-70" designation. When the A-12's performance potential was clearly found to be much greater, the USAF ordered a variant of the A-12 in December 1962, which was originally named R-12 by Lockheed. This USAF version was longer and heavier than the original A-12 because it had a longer fuselage to hold more fuel. The R-12 also had a larger two-seat cockpit, and reshaped fuselage chines. Reconnaissance equipment included signals intelligence sensors, a side-looking airborne radar, and a photo camera. The CIA's A-12 was a better photo-reconnaissance platform than the USAF's R-12, since the A-12 flew somewhat higher and faster, and with only one pilot, it had room to carry a superior camera and more instruments. During the 1964 campaign, Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater repeatedly criticized President Lyndon B. Johnson and his administration for falling behind the Soviet Union in developing new weapons. Johnson decided to counter this criticism by revealing the existence of the YF-12A USAF interceptor, which also served as cover for the still-secret A-12[18] and the USAF reconnaissance model since July 1964. USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay preferred the SR (Strategic Reconnaissance) designation and wanted the RS-71 to be named SR-71. Before the July speech, LeMay lobbied to modify Johnson's speech to read "SR-71" instead of "RS-71". The media transcript given to the press at the time still had the earlier RS-71 designation in places, creating the story that the president had misread the aircraft's designation. To conceal the A-12's existence, Johnson referred only to the A-11, while revealing the existence of a high speed, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In 1968, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara canceled the F-12 interceptor program. The specialized tooling used to manufacture both the YF-12 and the SR-71 was also ordered destroyed. Production of the SR-71 totaled 32 aircraft with 29 SR-71As, two SR-71Bs, and the single SR-71C. One view is that the SR-71 program was terminated due to Pentagon politics, and not because the aircraft had become obsolete, irrelevant, suffered maintenance problems, or had unsustainable program costs. In the 1970s and early 1980s, SR-71 squadron and wing commanders were often promoted into higher positions as general officers within the USAF structure and the Pentagon. (In order to be selected into the SR-71 program in the first place, a pilot or navigator (RSO) had to be a top-quality USAF officer, so continuing career progression for members of this elite group was not surprising.) These generals were adept at communicating the value of the SR-71 to a USAF command staff and a Congress who often lacked a basic understanding of how the SR-71 worked and what it did. However, by the mid-1980s, these SR-71 generals all had retired, and a new generation of USAF generals wanted to cut the program's budget and spend its funding on new strategic bomber programs instead, especially the very expensive B-2 Spirit. The USAF may have seen the SR-71 as a bargaining chip to ensure the survival of other priorities. Also, the SR-71 program's "product", which was operational and strategic intelligence, was not seen by these generals as being very valuable to the USAF. The primary consumers of this intelligence were the CIA, NSA, and DIA. A general misunderstanding of the nature of aerial reconnaissance and a lack of knowledge about the SR-71 in particular (due to its secretive development and operations) was used by detractors to discredit the aircraft, with the assurance given that a replacement was under development. Dick Cheney told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the SR-71 cost $85,000 per hour to operate.[113] Opponents estimated the aircraft's support cost at $400 to $700 million per year, though the cost was actually closer to $300 million.[24] The SR-71, while much more capable than the Lockheed U-2 in terms of range, speed, and survivability, suffered the lack of a data link, which the U-2 had been upgraded to carry. This meant that much of the SR-71's imagery and radar data could not be used in real time, but had to wait until the aircraft returned to base. This lack of immediate real-time capability was used as one of the justifications to close down the program. Attempts to add a datalink to the SR-71 were stymied early on by the same factions in the Pentagon and Congress who were already set on the program's demise, even in the early 1980s. These same factions also forced expensive sensor upgrades to the SR-71, which did little to increase its mission capabilities, but could be used as justification for complaining about the cost of the program. In 1988, Congress was convinced to allocate $160,000 to keep six SR-71s and a trainer model in flyable storage that could become flightworthy within 60 days. However, the USAF refused to spend the money. While the SR-71 survived attempts to retire it in 1988, partly due to the unmatched ability to provide high-quality coverage of the Kola Peninsula for the US Navy, the decision to retire the SR-71 from active duty came in 1989, with the last missions flown in October that year. Four months after the plane's retirement, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., was told that the expedited reconnaissance, which the SR-71 could have provided, was unavailable during Operation Desert Storm. The SR-71 program's main operational capabilities came to a close at the end of fiscal year 1989 (October 1989). The 1st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (1 SRS) kept its pilots and aircraft operational and active, and flew some operational reconnaissance missions through the end of 1989 and into 1990, due to uncertainty over the timing of the final termination of funding for the program. The squadron finally closed in mid-1990, and the aircraft were distributed to static display locations, with a number kept in reserve storage. Due to unease over political situations in the Middle East and North Korea, the U.S. Congress re-examined the SR-71 beginning in 1993. Rear Admiral Thomas F. Hall addressed the question of why the SR-71 was retired, saying it was under "the belief that, given the time delay associated with mounting a mission, conducting a reconnaissance, retrieving the data, processing it, and getting it out to a field commander, that you had a problem in timelines that was not going to meet the tactical requirements on the modern battlefield. And the determination was that if one could take advantage of technology and develop a system that could get that data back real time... that would be able to meet the unique requirements of the tactical commander." Hall also stated they were "looking at alternative means of doing [the job of the SR-71]." Macke told the committee that they were "flying U-2s, RC-135s, [and] other strategic and tactical assets" to collect information in some areas. Senator Robert Byrd and other Senators complained that the "better than" successor to the SR-71 had yet to be developed at the cost of the "good enough" serviceable aircraft. They maintained that, in a time of constrained military budgets, designing, building, and testing an aircraft with the same capabilities as the SR-71 would be impossible. Congress's disappointment with the lack of a suitable replacement for the Blackbird was cited concerning whether to continue funding imaging sensors on the U-2. Congressional conferees stated the "experience with the SR-71 serves as a reminder of the pitfalls of failing to keep existing systems up-to-date and capable in the hope of acquiring other capabilities."[ It was agreed to add $100 million to the budget to return three SR-71s to service, but it was emphasized that this "would not prejudice support for long-endurance UAVs" [such as the Global Hawk]. The funding was later cut to $72.5 million.[102] The Skunk Works was able to return the aircraft to service under budget at $72 million. Retired USAF Colonel Jay Murphy was made the Program Manager for Lockheed's reactivation plans. Retired USAF Colonels Don Emmons and Barry MacKean were put under government contract to remake the plane's logistic and support structure. Still-active USAF pilots and Reconnaissance Systems Officers (RSOs) who had worked with the aircraft were asked to volunteer to fly the reactivated planes. The aircraft was under the command and control of the 9th Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force Base and flew out of a renovated hangar at Edwards Air Force Base. Modifications were made to provide a data-link with "near real-time" transmission of the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar's imagery to sites on the ground. You will receive the item as shown in the first photo. Your original SSI shades of color may vary from different US-Made batch/location and/or PC settings. Our all US-Made Insignia patches here are NIR with LIFETIME warranty. You will receive the item as shown in the first photo. They will make a great addition to your SSI Shoulder Sleeve Insignia collection. You find only US Made items here, with the same LIFETIME warranty. LRSR not included.**eBay REQUIRES ORDER BE SENT WITH TRACKING, PLEASE SELECT USPS 1ST CLASS SERVICE w/TRACKING** **eBay REQUIRES ORDER BE SENT WITH TRACKING, PLEASE SELECT USPS 1ST CLASS SERVICE w/TRACKING** We'll cover your purchase price plus shipping. FREE 30-day No-Question returnALL US-MADE PATCHES HAVE LIFETIME WARRANTYWe do not compete price with cheap import copies.Watch out for cheap import copies with cut-throat price; We beat cheap copies with Original design, US-Made Quality and customer services.Once a customer, a LIFETIME of services

Price: 14.98 USD

Location: Kandahar Polo Club

End Time: 2025-01-21T12:13:18.000Z

Shipping Cost: 3.99 USD